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Abstract 
This paper studies the case of the socially responsible investment (SRI) industry in France. 
This case accounts for how the SRI category and practices have successfully moved from the 
margins of the industry in the late 1990s to become mainstream over two decades. We bring 
to the forefront the importance of three complementary factors in the process of causing 
corporations to transition toward more sustainable businesses: the role of investors and, in 
particular, institutional investors; the importance of the presence of a clear category 
definition and of intermediary organizations, providing ratings, scores, and other calculative 
devices; and the role of governments and regulators. With other studies, this case stresses the 
fundamental influence of investors in how corporations manage sustainability transitions. 
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According to prior research, there are two main means by which firms transition toward 
sustainability. First, firms can develop voluntary programs to reduce emissions and other 
negative externalities (Crifo & Forget, 2015). However, the impact of these programs is local 
and limited and leads to suspicions about the true motives and actual effects of these policies 
(Delmas & Toffel, 2008). Second, regulation at the country, regional, or even global level 
constrains firms in their behaviors and helps to protect areas and populations against negative 
externalities, as well as promoting alternative production modes (Crifo & Sinclair-Desgagné, 
2014; Sine & Lee, 2009; Georgallis, Dowell, & Durand, 2018). However, regulation can lead 
to unintended consequences, introduce competitive biases, and result in strenuous negotiation 
processes, as recently illustrated by the United States’ pause in the COP 21 Paris Agreement. 
Beyond these two classic and imperfect approaches, a third has emerged relatively unnoticed: 
transition as the result of institutional investors’ investment policies. This paper sheds light 
on this trend and, through an illustration, reveals the conditions under which it operates. 
Institutional investors play a major role in transitions toward sustainability (Davis, 
2009; Useem, 1996), as they actively orient corporations’ goal functions and theories of value 
(Arjaliès & Durand, 2019; Clark & Hebb, 2004; Crifo & Rebérioux, 2016). These investors 
push toward categorizing firms’ strategies as “green”, “alternative”, or “socially impactful”, 
sending signals that the investors value these investments and scrutinize their 
multidimensional impacts (Dimson, Karakaş & Li, 2016; Gond et al., 2018). Furthermore, the 
development of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria through rankings and 
assessments provides justification for investment decisions and presses firms to communicate 
their policies with regard to air and water pollution, diversity and human resource 
management, and decision making (Guthrie & Durand, 2008; Slager, Gond & Moon, 2012). 
Although the current proliferation of ESG ratings can confuse corporations, as well as 
investors, regarding how to prioritize specific social and environmental issues and these 
ratings cannot be equated with an actual improvement in corporate sustainability outcomes 
(Chatterji et al., 2016), the ratings provide investors with the means to push corporations 
toward the adoption of ESG management processes and the implementation of sustainability 
strategies (Delmas, Etzion, & Nairn-Birch, 2013). Therefore, the pressures exercised by 
shareholders in the context of financial markets—and in particular pressures from 
institutional investors—dramatically influence whether listed companies engage in 
sustainability transitions (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015). Despite their considerable influence, 
there has been little research on why and how institutional investors adopt policies favorable 
to ESG and sustainability transitions (Dimson et al., 2016). 
In this paper, we focus on the case of the progressive mainstreaming of the “socially 
responsible investment” (SRI hereafter) industry in France (Arjaliès, 2010; Crifo & Mottis, 
2016; Giamporcaro & Gond, 2016). SRI can be defined as a set of investment practices 
(Kurtz, 2008) that consider nonstrictly financial criteria in decisions on whether to acquire, 
retain or dispose of a particular investment (Cowton, 1999, p. 60), and these practices 
typically consist of including ESG criteria in investment processes (Eurosif, 2016; Yan, 
Ferraro & Alamandoz, 2018). According to Yan et al. (2018), we have witnessed a 
considerable increase in the number of SRI funds created globally between 1970 and 2014, 
and this phenomenon reflects a search for compatible financial and social logics. France, 
together with Norway, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), has emerged as 
both an early adopter of SRI and one of the most flourishing SRI industries over the last 
twenty years (see: Yan et al., 2018, p. 14). 
The specific organization of the “state-influenced market economy” (Schmidt, 2003, 
2016), such as the French national business system (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999), 
allows for better specifying the roles played by a national government in the process of SRI 
industry mainstreaming and sustainability transitions. Indeed, in contrast with “liberal market 
economies” (Hall & Soskice, 2001), such as the US, within which stakeholders play out their 
interests within a set of governmental institutions (Baron, 2012), state-influenced market 
economies similar to that of France have “a more influential state and a more hierarchical 
logic of interaction between firms, labor, and the state than in liberal market economies” 
(Schmidt, 2016). Accordingly, government and governmental entities in such institutional 
contexts can be approached as stakeholders on their own, with their own strategic agendas in 
relation to corporate social responsibility (CSR) or sustainability issues (Knudsen & Moon, 
2017), above and beyond the pressures exercised by stakeholders in governmental arenas. 
Our case analysis reveals three complementary conditions or drivers that together 
orient companies to (gradually) transition toward more sustainable business models. First, 
institutional investors should devote sufficient assets to emerging product categories. Second, 
there must be sufficiently clear market categories (what SRI is and what it is not) and an 
optimal number of market intermediaries (e.g., rating agencies, Nongovernmental 
Organizations—NGOs hereafter). Third, entities dealing with the public good—in our case, 
the government, operating as a unitary stakeholder—should play a decisive role in the market 
through successive regulations. Relying on the case of France, our analysis documents how 
those three conditions were at play and influenced the transition toward more sustainable 
business models. This complementarity created a “tipping point” within the financial markets 
that proved to be an effective lever of companies’ sustainability transitions by creating 
synergies and causing the marginal contribution of one type of actor to increase with the 
contributions of others. As a whole, our study therefore illustrates how these three specific 
conditions have determined the process of sustainability transition and its unfoldment over 
time along the four main phases (initiation, early adoption, diffusion, standardization) 
identified in Delmas, Lyon and Maxwell (2019). 
 
 The Case of Responsible Investment Mainstreaming in France 
The development of the SRI markets in France illustrates a successful sustainability transition 
in a specific institutional context that allows for conceptualizing the unique role played by 
government within the financial marketplace (Schmidt, 2003, 2016). Over the last 20 years, 
the French asset management industry—the third largest in the world after the US and the 
UK—has shifted toward the adoption of sustainable, responsible investing practices. In 2015, 
the total assets under management (AuM) for funds including investments that integrated at 
least minimal reference to ESG criteria had risen to €746 billion in France, and among these 
assets, AuM of more strictly defined SRI funds amounted to €322 billion (Novethic, 2015). 
These figures indicate that SRI has moved from the margin to the mainstream, as in 
proportion to the total AuM in the French market, the share of SRI represented approximately 
1% in 2007, 5% in 2011, and 18% in 2014. 
For these reasons, the French SRI industry has frequently been described as one of the 
most dynamic and successful European markets (see: Eurosif, 2016, 2018; Novethic, 2015) in 
terms of growth and profitability (Eurosif, 2016). Crifo and Mottis (2016) identified several 
signals suggesting that SRI was on its way to influence the French financial marketplace 
overall. For instance, an increasing number of French traditional institutional investors (i.e., 
solely focused on financial performance) have integrated SRI criteria not only into their 
dedicated SRI funds but also into their other conventional funds. In 2009, 63% of French 
conventional funds in terms of assets had already integrated at least one SRI criterion (Crifo 
& Mottis, 2016). In 2018, out of 439 SRI funds representing 144.4 bn of AuM, 150 (34%) 
can be regarded as “high-impact”, i.e., centrally focused on SRI (Novethic, 2018). 
As such, in 2018, France remains among the most developed SRI markets in Europe 
with more than 50 asset managers and asset owners, with a growth rate of approximately 55% 
in AuM for the 2011-2015 period. Among the variety of asset owners (who in total own 90% 
of assets in the French market), insurance companies were the main contributors to this 
growth in the French SRI market (Novethic, 2017). Two responsible investment strategies 
dominate the market: ‘best-in-class’ and ‘ESG integration’ accounted for more than €300 
billion each out of the €746 billion in the market (Novethic, 2017). In the even more recent 
period, we have witnessed a significant increase in “sustainability and environmental-themed 
strategies” (as defined by Novethic, 2017), stimulated by actions from the French 
government. COP 21 and the reporting obligations arising from Article 173 of France’s 
Energy Transition Law prompted this phenomenon, with many investors committed to 
engagements to integrate climate-related issues into their investment policies. The most 
popular themes are, in order of importance, “renewable energy”, “water management”, and 
“energy efficiency.” 
This current state of development of the French SRI market contrasts with the 
relatively low level of adoption of responsible investment practices by asset managers and 
pension funds in France in the 1980s and the quasi-absence of investment firms offering SRI 
products until the mid-1990s (Gond & Boxenbaum, 2013). In 1997, only seven SRI funds 
were commercialized in France, reaching barely €200 million of AuM (Muet et al., 2002); 
these funds were offered by a handful of pioneering asset managers (Déjean, 2005; Déjean, 
Gond & Leca, 2004). In 2015, the French marketplace counted 50 SRI fund suppliers 
commercializing almost 400 different SRI funds. Figure 1 provides an overview of this rapid 
development of the French SRI market between 1990 and 2016, showing the evolution of the 
number of SRI fund suppliers and SRI funds, as well as the total amount of assets managed 
under “socially responsible” criteria. 
-------------------------------------------- 
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This development has attracted academic attention. Prior studies have characterized 
the national specificity of the French SRI market in contrast with that of the US market 
(Louche & Lydenberg, 2006), identified the factors in its take-off in France in the mid-1990s 
(Déjean et al., 2004, 2013; Gond & Boxenbaum, 2013), accounted for its logical development 
(Arjaliès, 2010; Giamporcaro & Gond, 2016), uncovered the invisible network of friendship 
relations that regulate market functioning (Penalva Icher, 2010) and unpacked how the SRI 
product category became contested, recognized, and accepted (Arjaliès & Durand, 2019; 
Crifo & Mottis, 2016). Most academics’ and practitioners’ accounts of the French SRI market 
converge on a few central features. First, French SRI practices are mostly based on “positive” 
or “best-in-class” approaches, consisting of selecting the most socially responsible companies 
in an industry rather than “negative screening”—which consists of selecting corporate stocks 
on the basis of religious or ethical criteria (Gond & Boxenbaum, 2013). Positive screening 
practices better fit standards of financial investment processes than negative screening 
practices since these positive practices do not require eliminating complete industries from 
the investment universe and hence do not jeopardize the need for risk diversification across 
multéiple industries, which is essential to portfolio management (Arjaliès & Bansal, 2018; 
Déjean et al., 2004). It is therefore unsurprising to see the French market described in the last 
European study of SRI as “the undisputed leader in the best-in-class approach with a CAGR 
[Compound Annual Growth Rate] of 36% since 2013” (Eurosif, 2016, p. 12). 
Second, unlike other European SRI markets and reflecting the traditional ‘state-
centered’ organization of its national business system (Schmidt, 2016), the French SRI 
market has always been dominated by relatively “central” or “mainstream” asset owners such 
as the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignation (CDC),i and these asset owners are closer to the 
government and regulators rather than to peripheral actors (Crifo & Mottis, 2016; Déjean et 
al., 2004). This point was made clear in the 2016 Eurosif study: 
The French responsible investment market was primarily boosted by state-linked asset 
owners like the French Reserve Fund (FRR), the French civil servants complementary 
pension schemes (ERAFP and IRCANTEC) and the Caisse des Dépôts [CDC]. Over 
the last two years, growth in the French SRI market was again driven by asset owners 
and specifically by private and mutual insurance companies. Institutional investors 
today hold approximately 90% of SRI assets. Insurers have spearheaded the growth of 
the French market and represent more than 60% of SRI assets with total AuM of €465 
billion in 2015. They have generated 55% of the increase in the volume of 
Responsible Investment in 2015. (Source: Eurosif, 2016) 
SRI has indeed been either pioneered or imported by actors with work connections to 
state-owned and/or mainstream public financial institutions, such as the Caisse d’Épargne or 
the CDC in France (Gond & Boxenbaum, 2013). Third and finally, the concomitant creation 
of the SRI product category and the design of new calculative devices and practices (social 
ratings, quantified ESG indicators, labels) shaped the emergence and sustained the 
development of this market. Multiple indirect and direct governmental interventions 
channeled the discussions among opposed asset managers (Arjaliès, 2010; Crifo & Mottis, 
2016; Giamporcaro & Gond, 2016) to eventually lead to the unification of multiple SRI 
definitions and labels by the end of 2016. Today, there exists only one ‘official’ definition of 
SRI in France, which is posted on a website under the control of the Minister of Finance: 
SRI is a form of investment that aims to reconcile economic performance with 
social and environmental impact by financing companies and public 
organizations that contribute to sustainable development, whatever their activity 
sector. The SRI label, attributed through a strict labeling process led by 
independent organizations, is a unique milestone for savers who wish to 
participate in a more sustainable economy. (Source: www.lelabelisr.fr) 
Missing from this prior research on SRI in France, however, is an analysis of how 
these multiple factors interact and complement each other to explain the recent explosion of 
the French SRI market. Investigating the mainstreaming process of the French SRI market as 
a whole offers a unique opportunity to address this gap by reflecting on the conditions that 
cause institutional investors to be a hinge around which transitions toward sustainability 
revolve. By collecting so much savings and money and orienting via their funds toward 
certain objectives, institutional investors influence how listed firms attend to and act on 
critical evolutions and trends. In the next section, we isolate four key periods in the process of 
recent French SRI development: initiation (1997-2001), ramping up (2002-2007), 
intensification (2008-2012) and standardization (2013-2018). Each period corresponds to a 
shift in one or several of the three key indicators reported in Figure 1 and thus captures actual 
changes in the diffusion of sustainability practices among French institutional investors. We 
describe each period in turn, specifying the roles of key stakeholders and particularly the 
French state, in contrast to other institutional contexts such as the US, and in another section, 
we report on the combination of key conditions that made this evolution possible. 
 
Initiation (1997-2001): Category Definition and Calculative Devices 
The emergence of sustainability transitions within the finance industry and in institutional 
investors’ asset management divisions more precisely started with the creation of a new 
market category and the implementation of corresponding practices (Durand & Khaire, 
2017). Rather than emerging from the periphery of the industry through the impulsion of 
activists, as in the US (Markowtiz, 2007), in the mid-1990s, different actors from the 
financial community created the SRI category to fit their interests and the cultural context. 
Some mainstream French investors observed in SRI a way to develop a new financial product 
and thus to sustain the growth of their markets (Déjean et al., 2004). Others regarded SRI as a 
way to render acceptable the financial management of employees’ savings money or civil 
servants’ pensions in the eyes of French labor unions, which were traditionally opposed to the 
world of finance (Gond & Boxenbaum, 2013). Accordingly, SRI funds were in fact presented 
in France and Europe under the premise of financial performance from the very beginning, 
with a much more pragmatic definition of SRI emphasizing the equal importance of the 
financial and extrafinancial aspects (Louche & Lydenberg, 2006). Unlike Anglo-Saxon 
countries, in which SRI originally developed mainly for ethical and religious reasons 
(Markowtiz, 2007), SRI in Continental Europe, and especially in France, followed from the 
start a financial approach based on the development of positive screening methods relying on 
ESG criteria under the impulsion of labor unions in close relation with governments (Crifo & 
Mottis, 2016; Eurosif, 2012). 
The pioneering ESG rating agency Arese, a firm funded by the leading cooperative 
bank Caisses d’Épargne and then cofinanced by the CDC, played a key role in this process. 
Arese drastically adjusted the US-based SRI category system and practices to the local 
context. In the mid-1990s, French investors considered the SRI category to be morally 
imbued and nurtured by American idiosyncratic religious and political factors, and as such, 
they rejected it: the legacy of the Quakers’ philosophy and of the civil rights movements 
could hardly be exported intact to another country (Gond & Boxenbaum, 2013). Geneviève 
Férone, then CEO of Arese, and her team of analysts strategically downplayed the moral and 
religious connotations of SRI, focusing instead on organizations providing ESG data, such as 
Kinder Lydenberg and Domini (KLD). Loosely inspired by this model, they proposed to 
investors and fund managers a “neutral” and “objective” ranking based on 50 criteria 
assessing the environmental and social dimensions of all major French companies. Arese’s 
value proposition to asset managers was to choose stocks and investments that would 
enhance their funds’ long-term performance based on sound, quantified indicators (Déjean et 
al., 2004). 
Arese not only helped to create the SRI category (Durand & Khaire, 2017) but also 
offered French asset managers a justification for selecting the most “socially responsible” 
stocks. This rating system quantified ESG issues according to five categories corresponding 
more or less to stakeholder groups (community and civil society; corporate governance; 
clients and suppliers; shareholders; and hygiene, safety and the environment) and according 
to three levels of analysis (leadership, deployment and results). The final ratings from Arese 
ranged on a five-point scale from “– –” (for “unconcerned companies”) to “+ +” (for 
“pioneers”), and the whole process of rating involved the systematic analysis of multiple 
quantified criteria. Although inspired, albeit loosely, by the approach developed by KLD in 
the early 1990s, Arese’s system focused more on quantification being “serious and close to 
the traditional financial methodology” (Déjean et al., 2004, p. 753) and offered scores on 
multiple dimensions that could be easily used to adopt a “best-in-class” approach to SRI 
(Arjaliès, 2010). In contrast with KLD (see: Delmas et al., 2013; Gond, 2006; Igalens & 
Gond, 2005), Arese’s ratings did not distinguish between strengths and concerns in relation to 
social issues (i.e., “good” vs. “bad” behaviors) and were not mainly derived from media 
information. Arese’s ESG criteria were straightforwardly built to assess the quality of 
stakeholder management, quantified through a scoring system inspired by Total Quality 
Management (TQM) techniques (particularly the European Framework for Quality 
Management, a quality management standard also known as EFQM), and Arese’s analysts 
used all of the available quantified information about employees and the environment that 
could be obtained through the French “Social Report” (Bilan Social) published by 
corporations or through quantified datasets from the Ministry of Environment (Gond, 2006). 
Arese’s promoters firmly advocated for a “best-in-class” approach to ESG ratings and 
rejected the production or selling of exclusionary criteria (which then represented a source of 
revenue for agencies, such as KLD), which they regarded as morally and religiously 
connoted. 
Déjean et al. (2004) showed how the development of Arese’s ratings helped French 
investors to experiment with SRI funds and enabled the take-off of the market category 
between 1997 and 2001. Arese’s quantified approach was amenable to designing new SRI 
products, and fund managers could more easily “sell” internally the idea of launching such 
funds. In addition, Arese’s ratings contributed to legitimizing the SRI category and the notion 
of SRI funds more broadly in the eyes of then-skeptical asset managers. Although only 4 of 
the 12 existing SRI funds (33%) used Arese’s ratings in 1998, 34 of the 42 SRI funds (85%) 
relied on these ratings in 2001 (Déjean et al., 2004). 
This initiation stage was definitely characterized as ‘experimental’ by fund managers 
(Déjean, 2005) and as the “garage phase” by analysts and specialists in social rating (Gond, 
2006). Geneviève Férone concurred: “let’s be honest: we shared the same learning curve as 
our first customers; they helped us to test, refine, and validate our method” (Interview, 2002). 
Although, retrospectively, the 1990s appeared to be a period of timid take-off in light of the 
subsequent development and scaling up of the SRI market in France (see Figure 1), we 
nevertheless witnessed during this period an important institutional shift in parallel with the 
creation of the category and the first social ratings. 
This attention to long-term investment manifested itself also in the legal environment. 
Notably, a new law greatly influenced the subsequent phase of market transition, as the law 
directly promoted long-term investing and SRI in the French market. More precisely, in 1999, 
the French government created a Pension Trust Fund (Fonds de Réserve des Retraites, 
hereafter FRR, to be effective in 2001), the investment policy of which had to follow SRI 
principles. 
Mainstream investment managers had new incentives to adopt responsible investment 
practices if they wanted to capture a share of the vast amounts of money collected to secure 
the French population’s pension payments. This movement was backed by the rapid rise in 
institutional investors, both in France and the US, driven by the globalization of capital 
markets and the increasing concentration of household savings in investment funds. Although 
cross-shareholding between major nonfinancial companies remains far more prevalent in 
France than in “liberal market economies” such as the US, there was a considerable increase 
in institutional investors’ involvement in their governance: by the end of 2003, nonresident 
investors owned 43.9% of the outstanding shares of CAC40 companies and almost 35% of 
the shares of all listed companies (Crifo & Rebérioux, 2016). 
In summary, although SRI in the late 1990s and early 2000s was not yet a mainstream 
practice in France, several favorable conditions already existed: the product category had be 
defined; intermediary organizations such as Arese, supported financially by financial 
investors close to the government (CDC, Caisse d’Épargne), offered means to evaluate ESG 
policies; several credible investors launched SRI funds; globalization of markets led to a 
considerable increase in institutional investing; and governmental action provided incentives 
for such powerful investors to responsibly manage their funds in this market. 
 
Ramping Up (2001-2007): The Role of State Support 
The second stage of the transition process was characterized by the rapid intake of new 
adopters and products, corresponding to nearly effective consolidation of market 
development. The number of SRI fund suppliers increased steadily from 2001 to 2007 to 
reach 60, as did the number of SRI funds (from 89 to 175) and the SRI AuM (from 3 to 20 
billion euros). Three factors explain this market growth. First, the SRI market category 
strengthened between 2002 and 2007. Nicole Notat, the newly retired head of the largest 
French union (CFDT, French Democratic Confederation of Labour), launched a new social 
rating agency. Her project was soon coopted by Arese’s shareholders, who decided to merge 
Arese’s and Notat’s projects to create a new company, Vigeo, the mission of which was to 
rate even more firms based on more indicators at the European level. Thanks to her 
prominent unionist background, Notat mobilized her close relationships with some influential 
CEOs and political elites to enroll numerous French listed companies and the main French 
asset managers and trade unions in the Vigeo project (Giamporcaro & Gond, 2016). This 
move positioned the ratings agency closer to the French centers of power, legitimized SRI as 
a market category worth investing in, and explains why French investors kept referring to it 
over this period: in December 2007, 58% of all SRI funds used Vigeo’s scores. 
During this period, Vigeo also revised its ratings methodology to consider six 
dimensions (human rights, environment, human resources, business behavior toward 
customers and suppliers, corporate governance, and community involvement) based on a new 
model (called “equitics”), which contributes to reinforcing the SRI product category toward 
more mainstream methodologies (compared to the previous five domains rated by Arese). 
This new methodology provided better congruence between processes and outcomes of CSR-
related management practices, reinforcing differences with the US-based KLD model. In fact, 
a study based on secondary data from a French national survey on organizational practices 
(COI survey) showed that the quantitative metrics (outcomes) of CSR-related management 
practices seemed to convey similar information to the qualitative evaluation of CSR 
management processes from Vigeo (Crifo, Diaye, & Pekovic, 2016). Matching both 
databases, Crifo et al. (2016) examined the consistency between the two measures of CSR 
(management processes vs. outcomes) and found that companies with “high” Vigeo ratings 
implemented more CSR-related practices than companies with “low” Vigeo ratings, 
suggesting congruence between the two methods. 
Second, the emergence of the SRI market category in France raised attention and 
interest in competing social rating agencies headquartered abroad that decided to step into the 
French SRI market, offering new ratings to asset managers to guide their investment policies. 
Notably, the creation in 2001 of the Comité Intersyndical de l’Épargne Salariale (CIES, 
literally: Committee of the Inter-Union Employee Savings) sponsored a “trade unions’ SRI 
label” for a range of SRI employee savings funds. To obtain the CIES label and therefore be 
able to collect large amounts of employee savings for reinvestment in their funds, asset 
management companies had to demonstrate that their SRI funds were professionally managed 
and respected a series of key principles. Therefore, institutional investors (i.e., banks and 
insurance companies) created specialized internal teams of ESG analysts to respond to these 
new demands, prove their deeds, and protect their positions in the market contested by 
innovative new entrants. 
Third, state legislation kept reinforcing the momentum. The FRR’s policy, voted for 
in 1999 in favor of SRI investment, started showing its effects during this period. A second 
set of laws promoted transparency and richer information for investors about corporate 
responsibility reporting. In a context characterized by increased interest in regulating CSR at 
the European level (EU, 2001) and the development of a soft law on ESG disclosure with the 
constitution of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) as a global reporting standard (Etzion & 
Ferraro, 2010), the French government sought to keep its leadership in the domain of ESG 
disclosure by updating and refreshing 1977’s Loi sur le Bilan Social (literally: Law on social 
report) (CES, 1999). This older framework required the publication by corporations of a set 
of quantified information about the “social” aspects of their activities (Gond, Igalens & Brès, 
2013). Article 116 of the Loi sur les Nouvelles Régulations Economiques (or NRE law, 
literally: New economic regulations law) of July 2001 extended this prior legal framework by 
requesting that all companies listed on the first market (the largest market capitalizations) 
report on a yearly basis the social and environmental impacts of their activities. This law also 
made the publication of this information part of the core annual report to shareholders, rather 
than a separate report. Furthermore, new pension laws in 2001 and 2003 established a Plan 
Partenarial d’Épargne Salariale Volontaire (PPESV, literally: voluntary partnership 
employee savings scheme) and imposed a long-term perspective on savings (10 years). As a 
result, demand for SRI funds increased even more. 
During this period, the US financial markets witnessed the polar opposite trend with 
assets managed under sustainable and responsible investing resembling a U-shaped curve 
(decrease and slight increase): from $2.32 trillion in 2001 to $2.16 trillion in 2003, $2.29 
trillion in 2005 and $2.71 trillion in 2007. ESG integration even decreased by 20% between 
2003 and 2005, with the recovery in the SRI industry figures being due only to the increase in 
shareholder resolutions (US SIF, 2012). 
In summary, SRI in the 2000s became a mainstream practice in France due to several 
complementary drivers: constraining “hard” regulations from the French government on ESG 
disclosure, built on the legacy of regulative disclosure on social reporting and reflecting 
France’s state-centered type of capitalism; soft regulation from professional associations; 
professionalization of rating models; and more importantly, competition from “new entrant” 
stakeholder groups (in particular, labor unions and other ESG rating agencies) in the social 
and environmental evaluation industry. At the same time, the US market for SRI witnessed a 
mixed trend, with episodes of increases and decreases in assets invested under ESG 
integration. 
 
Intensification (2007-2012): Product Differentiation 
During the third phase, we observe that the relatively stable number of SRI fund suppliers 
started to intensify their offerings and opened many different SRI funds (see Figure 1). Crifo 
and Mottis (2016) reported that, from 2009 onward, the SRI product category spread within 
asset management firms—a process sometimes referred to as “ESG integration” or “ESG 
mainstreaming.” During this third period, the number of SRI products increased drastically, 
as did the volume of AuM (see Figure 1: from 140 funds on average during 2007-2009 to 250 
funds in 2012 and from less than 50 billion euros to more than 150 billion euros of AuM). 
This intensification of SRI fund creation generated some ambiguities in the market, 
and it became difficult to evaluate SRI quality across producers, as well as within each 
producer’s offerings. In parallel, the number of labels and ratings increased as well, and the 
market’s complexity increased even more. Raters shifted their focus of attention. The 
quantification of corporate stocks’ ESG quality receded relative to the evaluation of the funds 
themselves. This refocus is well illustrated by Novethic’s label repositioning. Novethic, a 
research and media nonprofit organization, an expert in sustainable finance, and a subsidiary 
of the major state-linked investment bank, had been pursuing the mission of pushing market 
players toward greater transparency and ESG impact assessment (for a detailed analysis of 
Novethic’s role in the SRI market, see: Giamporcaro, 2006). To this end, Novethic developed 
several certification schemes in 2009 to assess SRI funds in terms of ESG criteria. Over the 
years, several hundred funds applied to obtain Novethic’s certification, and more than 300 
funds offered by more than 40 asset managers (out of the 60 operating in France) were 
awarded this label. Emanating from an independent third party, the Novethic label signaled to 
investors in which SRI funds to preferably invest. 
During this phase, the precedent laws favoring SRI came into play to support market 
growth and the sustainability transition: more savings had to be invested in these products. In 
addition, in 2011, the Grenelle II law extended the reporting obligation on ESG dimensions to 
two types of actors: nonlisted, large French companies with more than 500 employees and 
French subsidiaries of foreign companies (Article 225) and asset managers and open-end 
investment companies (Article 224). This law also expanded the range of information 
required from all economic actors and requested more external verification to feed the 
businesses of rating agencies and market intermediaries. In addition, the government 
announced in 2012 its intent to create a new SRI label, and this fact probably shaped market 
actors’ expectations in relation to the future growth of the French SRI market. 
In the US, the increase in SRI was also vibrant, with total SRI assets of $3.74 trillion 
in 2012, a 56% increase since the end of 2009 (US SIF, 2012). However, a number of 
differences remained in the US industry, particularly regarding the criteria under scrutiny. In 
the US, governance criteria (e.g., executive pay and board issues) remain the core ESG issues 
for institutional investors, whereas these criteria play a less prominent role (and limited to 
corruption) in the disclosure requirements of the Grenelle II law, for instance. In France, the 
role of third-party organizations’ auditing ESG disclosures was also reinforced since the new 
reporting obligations required external certification. 
In summary, the intensification stage in the context of SRI market development was 
not so much about the growth in the number of SRI suppliers than about the diffusion of ESG 
practices within asset management firms, resulting in the multiplication of the number of SRI 
products. Once again, a specific category of stakeholders central to the state-focused French 
national business system played a leading role. State-linked asset owners, such as major 
pension funds and complementary pension schemes, and the actions of the major public 
investment banks bolstered the SRI industryii: very large amounts of savings were collected 
from civil servants’ wages for savings and future pensions that had to be invested 
responsibly, and labels, standards, and ratings multiplied both at the fund and asset manager 
levels. The SRI market became complex in an environment in which legal pressure 
intensified, requesting ESG information from an increasing number of corporations. 
 
Standardization Stage (2013-2018): Reducing Market Complexity 
As the legal consolidation of SRI was under way through prior governmental interventions, 
this most recent phase marks an almost exponential inflection in the number of products and 
AuM: from 250 funds to 400 and from €200 to €322 billion in AuM (see Figure 1). This 
surge coincided with the weight of institutional investors in the market, and these investors 
held approximately 90% of SRI assets in France in 2016. Insurers spearheaded the growth in 
the French market and represented more than 60% of SRI assets in 2016. They generated 
55% of the increase in SRI volume by themselves (Eurosif, 2016). 
Furthermore, to channel the growth during this last stage, the state intervened to 
reduce the proliferation of categories and labels. Indeed, after a series of media 
investigations, SRI portfolios appeared to contain similar stocks to those in non-SRI funds, 
casting some doubt on asset managers’ practices. The multiplicity of products and labels was 
obscuring institutional investors’ choices and was confusing for retail (small) investors, 
rendering such labels a tiny commercial stake (Arjaliès & Durand, 2019). Therefore, through 
two series of multiparty negotiations involving asset managers, NGOs, raters, and 
governmental representatives from 2013 to 2015, the definition of the SRI category was 
streamlined, legal frameworks were refined, and a consensus was established. Two new 
official labels were introduced in 2015—a general purpose label (SRI) and a green purpose 
label (TEEC)—both supported by the French government and taking over from other private 
labels, including Novethic’s SRI and green labels, which stayed in effect until the end of 
2016. The new SRI label was announced by the Minister of Finance in September 2015 
during Responsible Finance Week. Two months later, the Energy and Ecological Transition 
for Climate label (so-called TEEC) of the Ministry of Environment was launched during COP 
21. In January 2016, the French government created two certification tools for financial 
products that integrate ESG criteria. 
To qualify for the public general purpose SRI certification, financial products must 
meet standards defined by the finance ministry. Among other things, a fund must exclude 
20% of its initial investment universe on the basis of ESG criteria, or the average ESG rating 
of a portfolio must be higher than the rating of the benchmark index used to measure its 
financial performance. Asset managers who seek to obtain the public SRI label for one or 
more of their products must choose a labeling organization among those that will be approved 
by the French Accreditation Committee (COFRAC). The label will be awarded for a three-
year period, during which follow-up certification audits will be conducted. Based on 
Novethic surveys, there are potentially 300 SRI funds available on the French market. 
The TEEC label is different. It has a green purpose and was created “to spotlight the 
investment funds that finance the green economy, to spur the creation of new funds and to 
encourage companies to report the ‘green shares’ of their activities.” The TEEC certification 
scheme will identify products that genuinely finance activities with measurable 
environmental benefits and define the eco-sectors in which these products must be invested. 
These sectors range from transport and renewable energy to waste management and energy 
efficiency. This label is remarkable because of the exclusions it requires, i.e., activities 
having to do with “the exploration, production and use of fossil fuels, as well as the entire 
nuclear industry.” The impact of these initiatives on French financial operators will be closely 
analyzed by the various stakeholders, starting with NGOs, which are wondering whether 
these labels and reporting requirements for asset owners will be sufficient to mobilize the 
amount of assets needed to finance the energy transition (Novethic, 2016). 
This standardization phase also marked the extension of the disclosure requirements 
on firms. Article 173 of France’s Energy Transition Law of August 2015 now requires that all 
asset owners and asset managers disclose information about their management of climate-
related risks and, more broadly, about the integration of ESG parameters into their investment 
policies. France is the first country to introduce such disclosure requirements. 
In the US, the SRI market has continued its growth (by 30% between 2012 and 2016), 
but as for the previous period, a large difference with France lies in the ESG criteria under 
scrutiny by institutional investors: “governance” (executive pay, board issues, conflict risk) 
remains the dominant criteria, whereas “overall ESG integration” has witnessed a modest 
increase over the period (US SIF, 2016). The federal decision to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement on climate change also created a major gap between governmental drivers for SRI 
on the two sides of the Atlantic. 
Overall, the institutionalization of the SRI fund category has been buttressed by a 
series of events: multiparty negotiations led to new public labels that simplify market 
functioning. The new disclosure regulations intensify the production of ESG-related 
information, increase transparency, and reduce incentives to greenwash or decouple words 
from deeds. COP 21 in 2015 placed the notion of finance for carbon transition at the 
forefront, and the French government followed up with the One Planet Summit in 2017 to 
promote public and private finance in support of climate action. A second One Planet Summit 
is expected in late 2018 to evaluate the implementation of public commitments. 
Together, these trends have helped to consolidate the intraorganizational diffusion of 
responsible investing practices within asset management firms and institutional investors and 
have turned France into the uncontested leader of most ESG investment practices (Eurosif, 
2016). 
 
Contributing to a Corporate Sustainability Transition Model: A Decisive 
Complementarity Between the Three Factors of Interest 
Our case analysis provides fodder for the elaboration of the sustainability transition model 
proposed by Delmas et al. (2019). Our analysis reveals that the institutionalization of SRI in 
France occurred through the initiation, early adoption, diffusion, and standardization phases 
distinguished by Delmas (2019), but also sheds light on the importance in this case of the 
strong complementarity between institutional investors and regulators and market 
intermediaries—NGOs and ESG rating agencies—identifying new measurement and 
certification opportunities. Such a complementarity created a “tipping point” within the 
financial markets that proved to be an effective lever of companies’ sustainability transitions. 
This notion of complementarity has been used to examine whether and how 
companies use synergies among multiple dimensions of corporate sustainability to improve 
financial performance (Cavaco & Crifo, 2014; Crifo et al., 2016). In the context of the SRI 
market in France, the complementarity between the SRI drivers we identified relies on the 
idea that the marginal value of one driver (e.g., the dominant role of institutional investors) is 
increasing relative to the level of another driver (e.g., government interventions). In other 
words, there is a particularly interesting set of complementarities (i.e., combinations more 
than additions) among the following three important drivers of the SRI market that caused 
companies to transition toward more sustainable business models in the French context. 
 
Focusing on Institutional Investors as Influencers of Corporate Behavior 
First, not only producers but also investors played a key role in this corporate sustainability 
transition. In particular, institutional investors have not only contributed to legitimizing SRI 
but also invested insurance premiums, savings, and pensions into long-term SRI funds. Note 
that in the mid-1990s, institutional investors were already the major players in the equity 
market in the US (together with households) and in the UK (along with insurance companies) 
but not in France or Germany. In these countries, nonfinancial firms had the largest shares of 
stock ownership, with 42% and 19%, respectively (and less than 1% in the US and UK). 
However, since then, most continental European countries have experienced an upswing in 
equity holdings by institutional investors, both national (mainly mutual funds) and foreign 
(mainly US and UK pension and mutual funds). The case of France is emblematic of a large 
rise in institutional investors since the late nineties with very stable levels of ownership 
concentration and the emergence of new activist shareholders (sovereign wealth funds, hedge 
or private equity funds), counterbalanced by state and employee ownership ensuring the 
stability of French shareholdings for at least 25% of CAC 40 firms (Auvray, 2018). This 
evolution is closely related to the liberalization and globalization of capital markets and to the 
increasing concentration of household savings in investment funds (Crifo & Rebérioux, 
2016). 
Following this transformation in the equity capital of large, listed European 
companies, disclosure has been increasingly perceived as a crucial mechanism to enhance 
managerial accountability. Until the early 2000s in Europe, minority shareholders and 
investors’ rights to information were nonexistent, and no specific regulations disciplined 
listed companies in terms of reporting and disclosure—except for local markets’ listing 
standards. The dramatic improvement in corporate transparency and disclosure over the last 
decade across Europe and particularly mandatory CSR reporting in France therefore 
facilitated French institutional investors’ investment orientation and their choices in favor of 
the SRI fund category. 
Therefore, at the core of the model for corporate sustainability transitions, we should 
not only consider how certain categories are created and adopted by firms but also why 
investors in and owners of these firms modify their objectives and instantiate different 
theories of value (Boltanski & Esquerre, 2017; Lamont, 2012; Paolella & Durand, 2016). 
Since institutional investors have a longer-term orientation than typical actors in financial 
markets and since they are accountable for the use of the money that they invest vis-à-vis 
citizens, pensioners or current employees, these investors manage several purposes 
concurrently: not losing capital; investing responsibly and for the long term; and benefiting 
their own shareholders. As a result, institutional investors have an overlooked yet central 
political role to play in sustainability transitions, and more research attention should be 
dedicated to the analysis of this role, as well as to how investors should be governed to help 
deliver more sustainable economies. The growing stream of studies dedicated to corporate 
political responsibility (Frynas & Stephens, 2014; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, Lyon et al., 
2018) could probably help address this question, but to do so, these studies should move 
away from their present focus on corporations and multistakeholder dialogues to focus more 
systematically on the roles played by investors (Scherer et al., 2016). 
Interestingly, the role of institutional investors also explains the peculiar and 
divergent development of the US SRI industry at the same time, particularly the maintenance 
of its strong focus on governance issues, unlike that of French institutional investors who 
focus on the broader integration of multiple ESG issues within their investment decision-
making processes. 
 
Balancing Market Intermediaries’ Diversity and Complexity 
Second, since it is typical of the case of category creation (Durand & Khaire, 2017), several 
market intermediaries (playing the roles of new entrants) contributed to refining the 
category’s attributes and offering calculative devices (metrics and evaluation tools) to 
position different producers and products (Giamporcaro & Gond, 2016). This process is 
especially visible in the SRI industry since the development of SRI funds requires integration 
of ESG information into the investment firms’ decision-making processes (Arjaliès & Bansal, 
2018), and this information is either produced by ESG rating agencies or disclosed by 
corporations on a voluntary or mandatory basis. France is an early example of mandatory 
CSR reporting, with all French listed companies required to disclose ESG information since 
2001, and all large companies having to do so since 2011. The amount of available 
information has therefore been increasing, enabling the entry of multiple participants into this 
market intermediation. 
However, the institutionalization of the SRI category and corresponding practices had 
a mixed impact in the studied case, reflecting prior insights into the effects related to the 
multiplication of ESG evaluation criteria (Delmas et al., 2013) and mirroring some of the 
findings of Wijen and Chiroleu (2018) in the controversy produced by the design and 
adoption of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification standard. In our case, the 
abundant presence of data led to the multiplication of labels and calculative devices (e.g., 
scoring, ratings, and charts). On the one hand, as observed in related contexts (Reinecke, 
Manning & von Hagen, 2012), this abundance has some drawbacks and can become 
counterproductive by eroding each calculative device’s power to simplify decision criteria for 
decision makers (Chatterji et al., 2016; Delmas et al., 2013) and by obfuscating the evaluation 
of ESG for each actor, creating a form of “field opacity” (Wijen & Chiroleu, 2018): too many 
discrepant intermediaries obfuscate the reality that they should contribute to simplifying. 
On the other hand, as in the case of Wijen and Chiroleu (2018), the multiplication of 
intermediaries and potentially contradictory ESG evaluations for a same firm comes with its 
own unintended positive impacts. In our case, this increase provided analysts of asset 
management firms with incentives to develop their own in-house ESG expertise and to 
engage directly with corporations having ambiguous ESG scores through more strategic 
forms of engagement on ESG issues. 
Therefore, a condition for an effective corporate sustainability transition might be to 
“strike the right balance” in terms of the number and type of ESG intermediaries so that there 
is sufficient convergence in the assessments proposed by market intermediaries and sufficient 
diversity for asset management firms to strategically exploit the existing gaps in ESG 
evaluations. Vigeo partly addressed this risk with a methodology that provides informational 
content about management processes that seem congruent regarding specific matters with the 
outcome measures of secondary data on CSR practices (see Crifo et al., 2016). Nevertheless, 
the notion of “impact” rather than “process” remains a crucial stake for the future 
development of the SRI market. Interestingly, this issue of impact assessment is on the 
agenda of the scientific committee of the French SRI Label for the coming year. 
However, in contrast with the case reported by Wijen and Chiroleu (2018), we found 
that the controversies surrounding the multiplication of ESG evaluation standards were not 
only shaped by interactions between NGOs and corporations or a specific intermediary but 
also by the government’s direct and indirect actions. Indeed, the French government was 
involved in establishing an appropriate balance in terms of the number of ESG intermediary 
organizations indirectly by supporting some of them through the CDC (Giamporcaro & 
Gond, 2016) and directly by making mandatory the disclosure of ESG data, thus reducing the 
uncertainty surrounding ESG evaluations (see Figure 2). This change suggests that ‘hard’ 
governmental regulations can operate as complementary, rather than substituting for self-
regulatory or industry initiatives and intervening in controversies about standards to diminish 
the opacity of the market. 
 
Recognizing the Government Role 
Third, an enduring factor supported the corporate transition toward sustainability in the 
French SRI case: the role of the government as promoter of the public good and this role’s 
independence from the political side of running the country for the last 20 years. Several laws 
fashioned the sector and determined both the context of investments (pension and savings 
funds) and the expectations of the market actors. Notably, the pension laws created a trust 
fund (i.e., FRR) with a dedicated SRI policy based on the integration of ESG criteria into 
investment decision making and portfolio management. The establishment of the CIES 
interunion ‘SRI label’ reinforced the importance of CSR criteria since employee savings had 
to be invested in funds with this label. Eventually, the constant deployment of disclosure 
requirements about the social and environmental impacts of firms’ actions supplemented both 
the need for data to rate firms and products and the seriousness of the public policy vis-à-vis 
the multiple challenges posed by mounting socioeconomic inequalities and environmental 
risks. Accordingly, the French state has to a large extent “encouraged” the development of 
the SRI market both directly and indirectly and at multiple levels. Such a state-driven 
approach offers a unique opportunity to investigate in future studies the multiple roles that 
governments can play to cause sustainability transitions to occur (Knudsen & Moon, 2017). 
Such a peculiar role of government highlights important differences between market-oriented 
(liberal) economies such as the US, where capital needs are satisfied by dispersed (minority) 
shareholders and corporations are disciplined by market-based forces, and more centralized 
“state-influenced market economies” such as France, within which firms are expected to 
represent the broader social interests that must be considered as much as those of capital 
providers and the government therefore is called in (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Schmidt, 2016; 
Whitley, 1999). Figure 2 represents the three main factors and their interrelationships leading 
to corporations transitioning toward more sustainable strategies and practices. 
This case is all the more interesting since SRI has been accelerating and gaining 
enormous momentum beyond the French context since the Paris Agreement at COP 21 in 
2015. The global challenge of raising the trillions needed to meet the two degrees or less 
scenario agreed to in Paris in 2015 dictates that this process cannot be driven through either 
the public or private sector working alone but truly through complementarities and synergies 
between them. In the UK, the London Green Finance Initiative was established in 2016 to 
bring these groups together and determine where the UK’s great financial acumen could 
make its contribution (GFT, 2018). Europe also installed an EU High-Level Expert Group 
(HLEG) on Sustainable Finance in 2017. The HLEG is an interesting example of involving 
different and complementary stakeholders in financial reform, including banking, insurance, 
asset management, stock exchanges, financial industry associations, international institutions 
and civil society, to elaborate recommendations on concrete measures that the EU can 
undertake to align one of the world’s largest financial systems with global objectives for 
sustainability. Among these measures, the HLEG recommends establishing an EU 
sustainability taxonomy, clarifying investor duties to extend the time horizons of investments 
and bring greater focus to ESG factors, upgrading disclosures developing official European 
sustainability standards, and integrating sustainability into the governance of financial 
institutions as well as in financial supervision (HLEG, 2018). Interestingly, several of the 
actors who led the SRI development in France over the last 20 years were also part of this 
influential European expert group. Future research could more closely investigate these 
institutional dynamics and, in particular, how some initiatives developed in “state-influenced 
market economies” such as France could diffuse to other types of economies through 
European institutions. 
The recent debates in France in 2018 to redefine the role and missions of companies 
provided a reinforcing argument on the role of government, together with other influential 
stakeholders, in driving investors toward corporate sustainable transitions. The French 
government indeed appointed two teams—one chaired by Jean-Dominique Senard, CEO of 
Michelin, and Nicole Notat, President of Vigeo-Eiris; and another chaired by Antoine Frérot, 
CEO of Veolia, and Daniel Hurstel, a lawyer at Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP—to submit a 
report in the first half of 2018 proposing legislative changes (the PACTE law to be debated 
and voted on in late 2018 to early 2019) to allow companies to insert “a mission” into their 
articles of association. 
What the specificity of the case studied in this article demonstrates is the fundamental 
complementarity of the entities responsible for the public good. In France, for historical and 
cultural reasons, the central state fulfills this mission but under the contestability of other 
stakeholders (trade unions, NGOS, and public-private agencies). In other contexts, similar to 
Canada or the US, different entities also interact to codefine and defend the long-term public 
good. Our point therefore underscores the necessity to factor in who the actors are 
contributing to forging what the public good is and what it ought to become, as well as how 
and how much corporations participate actively or reactively in these debates and public 
policy decisions. Multiple situations and games potentially exist and must be exposed without 
disingenuousness on the part of researchers, who must accept neither corporate 
communications nor public authorities’ official discourses at face value. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper studies the case of the SRI industry in France. The case analysis emphasizes three 
important complementary factors that accompanied the development of SRI in France and its 
influence on corporate transitions toward sustainability (see Figure 2). First, investors, as 
large influencers of the market, orient the corporations’ goal functions and theories of value. 
Second, a balance must be found between sufficiently clear and accepted market categories 
(what an SRI fund means and is) and the number of intermediaries that provide the criteria 
and calculative devices enabling the assessment of category members. Finally, our case 
vividly portrayed the preponderant influence on the SRI industry’s sustainability transition of 
the entities in charge of defining and preserving the public good—in the case at hand, the 
central state, contested by very active newcomers to the market. In conclusion, to understand 
how corporations can be driven to sustainability transitions, we must interpret their 
transitioning as a complementary set of strategies between institutional investors and 
governments, with market intermediaries (rating agencies, NGOs) shaping the definition of 
product categories and legitimizing calculative devices and practices. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. The Development of the French SRI Market (1997-2016)*
 
* Sources: Muet et al. (2002) for the period 1998-2003, for the period 2003-2015: Novethic and AMF (Associations Française des Marchés Financiers). 
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Figure 2. Three complementary conditions for corporate transitions toward 
sustainability 
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Endnote 
i The CDC is a French public sector financial institution that has no strict equivalent in the US. It is usually 
regarded as the ‘investment arm’ of the French state, and its head is appointed by the government. According to 
French law, the CDC’s mission is defined as follows: “Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations and its subsidiaries 
constitute a public group serving the public interest and the country’s economic development. The Group carries 
out missions of public interest in support of the public policies implemented by the State and local government 
bodies and may also exercise competitive activities […] Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations is a long-term 
investor and contributes to the development of enterprises in line with its own proprietorial interests” (source: 
Article L. 518-2 of the French Monetary and Financial Code (amended by the 2008 law on modernization of the 
economy). The CDC is strategically located at the interface of governmental and financial institutions and plays 
a key role in the ‘state-centered’ French economy. 
ii The sizable boost related to the creation of public pension funds is clear in the proportion of pension funds as a 
percentage of institutional investors in the French market, which has increased from 4% in 2004 to 15% in 2014 
(Source EFAMA). 
                                                          
